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Making Sense of Apprendi and its Progeny
Erwin Chemerinsky*
It is not hyperbole to say that no Supreme Court decision in years has had
more practical effect than Apprendi v. New Jersey.' In Apprendi, the Supreme
Court held that any factor, other than a prior conviction, that leads to a sentence
greater than the statutory maximum must be proven to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the fewer than six years since Apprendi, there have been
several important Supreme Court decisions and thousands of lower federal court
rulings' concerning its applications.
The law surrounding Apprendi has produced a bewildering series of
distinctions. Apprendi requires any factor that leads to a sentence greater than the
statutory maximum to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but not a prior
conviction.4 Apprendi applies to sentencing under "guideline" systems,5 but not to
mandatory minimum sentences. Apprendi applies to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines"), but means that the Guidelines can remain in force so
long as they are advisory and not mandatory.7
Each of these distinctions seems arbitrary and highly questionable. For
example, why should everything that leads to a sentence greater than the
statutory maximum have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but not a prior
conviction? Why should brandishing a weapon have to be proven to a jury if the
sentence is under a guideline system, but the same factor can be proven to a
judge if it is under a mandatory minimum law? If it is the mandatory nature of
the Guidelines that made them unconstitutional, then why doesn't Apprendi
apply to mandatory minimum sentences?
In reality, many of these distinctions seem to be based on the views of a
single Justice, often one who hasn't written an opinion explaining his or her
reasoning. Almost all of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area have been by
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. I want to thank Garrick
Sevilla for his outstanding research assistance. I also want to thank Sara Beale and Laurie Levenson for
enormously helpful conversations that are reflected throughout this article.
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that Apprendi applies to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the remedy is that they are advisory, not mandatory); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that any factor, other than a prior conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the
crime the defendant pled guilty to or the jury convicted of must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt); United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory
minimum sentences); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that, based on Apprendi, juries, not judges,
must find the aggravating factors warranting imposition of a death sentence).
3. An attempt to do a Westlaw search of cases citing Apprendi generated a response that there were too
many documents to produce a result.
4. United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
5. Booker, 543 U.S. 220; Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
6. Harris, 536 U.S. 545.
7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
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five to four margins. As a result, the shift of a single Justice is responsible for
distinctions in the law. For example, in Harris v. United States, the four
dissenters from Apprendi--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer-were joined by Justice Scalia, who had been in the
majority in Apprendi, to hold that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory
minimum sentences. Justice Scalia did not write an opinion to explain why he
saw a distinction. Even more dramatically, in United States v. Booker, Justice
Ginsburg voted with the other Justices who had been in the majority in
Apprendi-Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas-to hold that Apprendi
applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. But she joined the four dissenters
from Apprendi to hold that the remedy is that the Guidelines could continue so
long as they are advisory. She did not write an opinion to explain her switch.
My goal in this article is to offer a way to make sense of the law in this area.
I suggest that Apprendi and its progeny should be seen as establishing a simple
proposition: under the Sixth Amendment, it is wrong to convict a person of one
crime and sentence that person for another. I then apply this principle to criminal
sentencing and suggest that if Apprendi is taken as establishing this basic rule,
then many of the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of sentencing are wrong
and will need to be changed.
This is a particularly important time to reexamine Apprendi and its progeny
because of the change in the composition of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor were in the majority in crucial five to four
decisions limiting the application of Apprendi, such as in holding that Apprendi
does not apply to mandatory minimum sentences and that the Guidelines are
constitutional so long as they are advisory and not mandatory. If either Chief
Justice Roberts or Justice Alito disagrees, the Court could revisit these issues and
come to the opposite conclusion. And this, of course, is an area where ideology
offers no prediction of a Justice's likely vote. Justices Scalia and Thomas were in
the majority in Apprendi and Booker L' If either Roberts or Alito agrees with
their view, and that is at least a reasonable possibility, the law in this area could
change dramatically, and soon.
Part I of the article defends my interpretation of Apprendi: that it is wrong to
convict a person of one crime and then sentence the person for another. Part II
traces the implications of this for the law of criminal sentencing.
8. The only exception was Ring v. Arizona, applying Apprendi to capital sentencing, which was a seven
to two decision. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
9. By Booker 1, I mean the decision holding that Apprendi applies to the Guidelines. By Booker H, I
mean the decision holding that the appropriate remedy is to make the Guidelines advisory and not mandatory.
532
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I. THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF APPRENDI
My central thesis is that Apprendi stands for the proposition that it is wrong
to convict a person for one crime and sentence the individual for another.
Initially, as a descriptive matter, this is apparent from the Apprendi decision
itself.
In December 1991, Charles Apprendi ("Apprendi") fired several shots "into
the home of an African-American family that had moved recently into a
previously all-white neighborhood."' Apprendi was quickly arrested and told
police that he had done this "because they are black in color" and he did not want
them in the neighborhood." Apprendi ultimately pled guilty to second-degree
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.' 2 Under New Jersey law, the
penalty for this offense is a sentence of five to ten years in prison.
Additionally, under the terms of the plea agreement, the state reserved the
right to ask the judge to impose a greater sentence under the New Jersey hate
crime law.'3 New Jersey, like many states, has a statute that provides for greater
penalties when it is proven that a crime is hate motivated. New Jersey law
provides for an "extended term" of imprisonment if the judge finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that "the defendant in committing the crime acted
with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."'4 Under
the terms of the plea agreement, Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the hate
crime enhancement of his sentence as violating the United States Constitution.
The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to the maximum sentence of ten years in
prison for possession of a firearm for unlawful purposes.'5 Although Apprendi
recanted his statement to the police about his reasons for the shooting and said
that it was not accurately described, the judge found that the evidence supported
a finding "that the crime was motivated by racial bias."''6 The judge imposed an
additional two years of imprisonment based on the New Jersey hate crimes law.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the penalty enhancement
requires proof, to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. More precisely, the question
for the Court was whether such a penalty enhancement should be regarded as a
sentencing factor, which can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence to the
judge, or an element of the offense, which must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court took the latter
view. In an unusual division among the Justices, Justice Stevens wrote the
10. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 469-70.
13. Id. at 470.
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-44-3(e) (West 1995).
15. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
16. Id. at 471.
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opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg."
The Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 8 The Court
stated, quoting a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in a decision from a
year before: "It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 9
The Court explained that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law,
together with the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury, entitle a criminal
defendant to a jury determination that he is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of
every element of the crime for which he is convicted and sentenced. Simply put,
the Court held that it violates due process and the Sixth Amendment to convict a
person of one crime, but punish him or her for another. Apprendi was convicted
of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, but he was sentenced both for
this crime and for the separate offense of having acted with an impermissible
hate-based motive. The Court ruled that this latter factor essentially was a
separate crime and it too must be proven to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.
To be sure, subsequent cases have not articulated the Apprendi principle this
way. But it explains exactly what the Court did in Apprendi and from a
normative perspective it is a desirable principle under the Sixth Amendment.
Apprendi, and all of the subsequent decisions applying it, are about applying to
basic principles of the Sixth Amendment: proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
trial by jury. My interpretation of Apprendi would have it stand for the basic
notion that any crime a person is convicted of committing should have to be
independently proven beyond a reasonable doubt and have to be found by the
jury. As a normative matter, it seems basic and even uncontroversial to say that
all crimes should have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and to a jury. It
seems intuitively unfair to convict a person for one crime and then sentence the
person for a different offense.
This interpretation of Apprendi has another virtue: it provides a manageable
principle to separate the role of the judge and the jury in the criminal justice
system. If Apprendi means that any factor that leads to a greater sentence must be
proven to the jury, then it will truly mean the end of judge-imposed sentencing.
For example, judges frequently impose greater sentences based on their sense
that a defendant has not shown remorse for the crime. Few would think that this
is a determination for the jury, but it is if Apprendi means that any factor that
17. Id. at 468.
18. Id. at 490.
19. Id. at 487 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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leads to a greater sentence must be proven to the jury. However, if Apprendi is
taken as establishing a more limited proposition-that it is wrong to convict a
person of one crime, but sentence the person for a different crime-then it
explains why the judge can impose a greater sentence for failure to show
remorse. That, of course, does not involve a separate criminal offense. In
Apprendi, by contrast, there were violations of two separate criminal statutes and
the Court was simply requiring that both offenses be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
I do not assume that it always will be clear and obvious whether there were
two crimes involved. But I believe that this approach will focus the inquiry on
the right question. Blakely v. Washington illustrates the potential difficulty of
deciding if there were two crimes involved, but also why this is the right
inquiry.20 Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. was a man in Washington who was
convicted by a jury of kidnapping his estranged wife." The sentence for this
crime, under Washington law, is fifty-three months in prison.22 But the judge, in
sentencing, found that the defendant committed the crime with "deliberate
cruelty" and increased the penalty to ninety months in prison. -3 The ninety
months was still within the statutory maximum for the crime.
The issue was whether the finding of deliberate cruelty was a sentencing
factor that could be determined by the judge, or whether it was deemed an
element of the offense, which must be found by the jury. The Supreme Court, in
a five to four decision, with Justice Scalia writing the majority, held that
Apprendi applies. 24 The Court concluded that any factor, other than a prior
conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the crime that the defendant pled
guilty to, or that the jury convicted for, must be proven to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.25 The significance of Blakely, of course, is that the Supreme
Court extended Apprendi to sentences within the statutory maximum.
Yet, the question is why should "deliberate cruelty" be a factor to be found
by the jury? Why is it an element of the offense rather than a sentencing factor,
like the failure to show remorse? The answer seems straightforward: deliberate
cruelty makes it a different crime than the same offense with a different mental
state. Blakely was convicted just of the crime of kidnapping, but he was
sentenced for the separate criminal offense of kidnapping with deliberate cruelty.
The enormous difference in the sentence reflects that this was regarded as a
separate crime. As a separate crime, it was necessary to require that it be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a jury.
20. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
21. Id. at 298-99.
22. Id. at 299.
23. Id. at 300.
24. Id. at 303-05.
25. Id. at 301,313.
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This, of course, will require courts to decide when factors constitute a
different criminal offense, which often will mean deciding when something is a
difference in kind as opposed to a difference in degree. For example, when is the
increase in the quantity of drugs sufficient to make it a separate crime? When is
the difference in mental state sufficient to make it a separate crime? But I
contend that these are the right questions to focus on in applying the Sixth
Amendment's requirements for proof beyond a reasonable doubt and trial by
jury.
Ultimately, this will require analysis of what constitutes a crime. Justice
Thomas recognized exactly this when he declared in a concurring opinion in
Apprendi: "This case turns on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes
a 'crime. ' '2 6 The question, of course, is not simple at all. For example, Justice
Thomas's definition of a crime is enormously broad. He said that "a 'crime'
includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing
punishment., 27 The Court's definition of crime in Blakely is similar to this. 28 But
this would seemingly make every factor that increases the sentence, even the
failure to show remorse, into a crime.
That isn't right because the failure to show remorse is not, by any
conception, a separate crime. On the other hand, in Apprendi and Blakely, for the
reasons described above, it makes sense to see there having been separate
criminal offenses.
My focus in this article is not to elaborate on how to determine what is a
crime or if there are separate criminal offenses. 29 Rather, my goal is to suggest
that this is the appropriate question for courts to focus on and to sketch the
implications of this being the central issue.
II. IMPLICATIONS
What would be the implications of interpreting Apprendi and Blakely as
standing for the proposition that it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and
sentence the person for another? In this section, I suggest that a number of the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning sentencing and aspects of criminal
proceedings would need to be revisited and changed.
26. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 460, 499 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 501.
28. Blakely, 542 U.S at 304 ("When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not
allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the punishment."' (quoting 1 JOEL
P. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 at 55 (2d ed. 1872))).
29. For an excellent discussion of this, comparing charge-offense sentencing with real-offense
sentencing in terms of what is a crime, see David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense
Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403 (1993).
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A. Using Acquittals as Bases for Enhancements and the Implications for Double
Jeopardy
Perhaps the most obvious implication of the approach that I am suggesting is
that no longer should acquittals be used to increase sentences. In United States v.
Watts, the Court held that acquittals may be used to enhance sentences.3 ° Watts
was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.' He was tried, but
acquitted of possessing a firearm in connection with a drug crime.32 Nonetheless,
the judge found firearm possession by a preponderance of the evidence and
increased the length of the sentence.33 The Court said that it was "well established
that a sentencing judge may take into account facts introduced at trial relating to
other charges, even ones of which the defendant has been acquitted. ' 34 In a per
curium opinion the Court declared: "We therefore hold that a jury's verdict of
acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct
underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. 35
In his majority opinion in Booker II, Justice Breyer cited Watts with
approval.36 Indeed, across the country every day, in federal court and state court,
defendants are receiving additional punishments-often very large increases--
for crimes for which they were acquitted.
Non-lawyers are shocked when I tell them about this routine occurrence. A
defendant can be acquitted of nine of ten counts--or for that matter ninety-nine
of 100 counts-in an indictment and the judge can use the acquittals to increase
the sentence so long as the judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the crime was committed.
This is obviously inconsistent with the principle that it is wrong to convict a
person of one crime and then to sentence the person for another. The basic
constitutional principles that underlie Apprendi and Blakely, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and trial by jury, are undermined when a judge ignores the
jury's verdict of acquittal and imposes a greater sentence by finding a crime was
committed by a preponderance of the evidence.
Watts thus must be overruled as inconsistent with Apprendi and Blakely.
Doing so actually would have broader implications in terms of the law of double
jeopardy. Integral to the Court's holding in Watts was its conclusion that it does
30. 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).
31. Id. at 149.
32. Id. at 149-50.
33. Id. at 150. The district court added two points to his base offense level under the Guidelines. Id.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Id. at 157.
36. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 (2005).
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not violate double jeopardy for the sentencing judge to enhance a sentence based
on a crime for which the defendant was committed.37
If it were wrong to convict for one crime and punish for another, then the
Court's puzzling double jeopardy jurisprudence would be rendered obsolete or
overruled. The Court has found double jeopardy protections inapplicable to
sentencing proceedings because the determinations at issue do not place a
defendant in jeopardy for an "offense."38 Also, sentencing enhancements are not
additional punishment for the previous offense. Rather, they act to increase the
sentence "because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the crime
of conviction."3 9 In United States v. DiFrancesco,° the Supreme Court articulated
three reasons why facts determined at sentencing proceedings should be treated
differently than facts determined at trial. First, "[h]istorically, the pronouncement
of sentence has never carried the finality that attaches to an acquittal." t Second,
facts determined at sentencing do not "approximate the ordeal of trial on the
basic issue of guilt or innocence. 4 2 The defendant is not subject to the same
"embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity and the possibility that he may
be found guilty even though innocent., 3 Third, a sentence is determined "in large
part on the basis of information, such as the presentence report, developed
outside the courtroom."" Moreover, it is "purely a judicial determination, and
much that goes into it is the result of inquiry that is nonadversary in nature.
'4
1
While it is debatable whether the Court's reasons are persuasive, they are
obsolete if it were wrong to convict a person for one crime and punish for
another. Since every fact legally essential to imposing a sentence must be
charged and proved to a jury to avoid punishing a person for another crime, it is
no longer true that a pronouncement of a sentence does not carry the finality of
an acquittal. Furthermore, it is no longer true that the determination of a sentence
does not "approximate the ordeal of a trial." Lastly, since facts essential to
punishment must be proved to a jury, it is no longer true that a sentence is
"purely a judicial determination" involving nonadversarial facts.
Hence, some of the Court's highly questionable jeopardy decisions would be
overruled. For example, in Witte v. United States, a defendant pleaded guilty to
marijuana possession.46 The judge enhanced the sentence based on the pre-
37. 519 U.S. at 156 ("[A]n acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from
relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof."
(quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990))).
38. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
39. Watts, 519 U.S. at 154.
40. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
41. Id. at 133.
42. Id. at 136.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 136-37.
45. Id. at 137.
46. 515 U.S. 389, 393 (1997).
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sentence report's indication that the defendant was involved in a prior attempt to
import cocaine.4 ' Later, a grand jury indicted the defendant for that same attempt
to import cocaine. 48 The Court rejected the double jeopardy challenge, since the
first indictment did not charge the same offense for which the defendant plead
guilty.4 9 Furthermore, the Court has rejected the argument that double jeopardy
principles bar a later prosecution or punishment for criminal activity where that
activity has been considered for sentencing for a separate crime. 0 The only
limitation is when the sentencing range is so broad and the enhancing role of the
defendant's conduct so significant, that the conduct becomes "a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense."5' But so far, the "tail which wags the dog"
principle has not been a meaningful limitation.52
In Monge v. California, the Court held a prosecutor may again seek a
sentencing enhancement for a prior conviction without violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause, when the sentence was vacated and remanded by an appellate
court due to insufficient evidence of the prior conviction.53 At issue in Monge was
California's "three-strikes" sentencing scheme, under which defendants are
54entitled to separate jury trial concerning their prior convictions. The beyond a
reasonable doubt standard as well as other procedural safeguards are applied in
these proceedings during a guilt/innocence trial 5 Evidence of a defendant's prior
convictions was found insufficient by a California appellate court, which
56remanded the case for further sentencing proceedings. The court also held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial of the defendant's prior conviction. 7 In
rejecting the defendant's double jeopardy argument, the Court affirmed that
double jeopardy protections are inapplicable at sentencing.58 Thus, a prosecutor
may take as many bites at the apple as required to prove a sentencing
enhancement by whatever standard of proof a state adopts.
In sum, the idea that it is wrong to convict a person for one crime and punish
for another undermines the rationale for treating sentencing proceedings different
from guilt/innocence proceedings for double jeopardy purposes.
47. Id. at 394.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 396; see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ("[W]here the same act
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not.").
50. Witte, 515 U.S. at 398; see also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
51. Witte, 515 U.S. at 403 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
52. I could find no Supreme Court cases using this principle as a limit.
53. 524U.S. 721 (1998).
54. See id. at 725.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 725-26.
57. Id. at 726.
58. Id. at 728.
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B. Booker II Was Wrongly Decided
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that Apprendi applies to
the Guidelines, but that it is constitutional so long as the Guidelines are advisory
and not mandatory. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, stated: "That is to say,
without this provision-namely the provision that makes 'the relevant sentencing
rules mandatory and impose[s] binding requirements on all sentencing judges'-
the statute falls outside the scope of Apprendi's requirement."5 9
Lower courts have been struggling ever since Booker to figure out what it
means to have the Guidelines be advisory and how appellate courts are to decide
what is reasonable. It appears that the law is that federal district courts must
consider the Guidelines and justify any departures. If so, it is difficult to see how
this is much different than the approach before Booker. That, of course, would
please four of the five Justices in the majority in Booker II since they dissented as
to the application of Apprendi and Blakely to the Guidelines and, for that matter,
dissented in Apprendi and Blakely.
But if the Court were to embrace the principle that it is wrong to convict a
person of one crime and sentence the person for another, the error in Booker II
would be obvious. It would not matter whether the sentencing court was required
to impose the sentence or if the court had discretion; either way it is wrong to
sentence a person for a crime for which he or she was not convicted. Indeed, it is
simply impossible to reconcile Booker II with Apprendi and Blakely if they are
seen as establishing the principle that a person should not be convicted of one
offense and sentenced for another.
C. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Harris stands for the proposition that judicial factfinding is permissible under
the Sixth Amendment when it enhances a mandatory minimum sentence. 60 This
decision gives full scope to the Court's sentencing factor/offense element
jurisprudence, which began with McMillan v. Pennsylvania.6, McMillan was
affirmed in Jones v. United States, which declared "any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in
an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.,
62
If it is wrong to convict for one crime but punish for another, then there is no
meaningful distinction between a fact that increases a mandatory minimum and
one that increases a maximum penalty. Justice Thomas, in his Harris dissent,
wrote, "[t]he Court's holding today rests on either a misunderstanding or a
59. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
60. 536 U.S. 545, 560-61 (2001).
61. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
62. 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
540
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rejection of the very principles that animated Apprendi just two years ago." '63
Even Justice Breyer who concurred in the judgment could not "easily distinguish
[Apprendi] from [Harris] in terms of logic."'
Apart from Harris's conceptual inconsistency with the idea that it is wrong
to convict for one crime but punish for another, it also makes little sense from a
practical perspective. A mandatory minimum sentencing rule "carries far greater
significance for the actual punishment in most cases" then the increase of a
maximum penalty.6 ' That is because a "statutory minimum binds a sentencing
judge; a statutory maximum does not."66
More importantly, Harris is a sizable hole in the jury trial right guarantee,
and thus still exposes defendants to punishment for crimes they did not commit.
For example, following Blakely a proposal was submitted to the United States
Sentencing Commission to simply increase the top of each guideline range to the
statutory maximum for the convicted offense.67 Hence, "Guidelines factors would
not be elements" and the factors could "still be constitutionally determined by
post-conviction judicial findings of fact."''
A simple example shows why Harris cannot be reconciled with Apprendi.
Harris involved a criminal defendant who received a mandatory minimum
sentence of seven years for brandishing a weapon while engaged in drug
trafficking.69 The Court said that since it was a mandatory minimum scheme, the
factor did not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But imagine that the
defendant had been convicted under a system that used sentencing guidelines and
brandishing a weapon during a drug crime led to an increase in the sentence by
seven years. Then brandishing would have to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. There is no imaginable basis for this distinction.
Furthermore, Harris cannot be reconciled with the Court's reasoning and
holding in Booker I. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that what
was constitutionally objectionable about the Guidelines was that they were
mandatory. The Court concluded that if they were advisory and not mandatory,
then they were permissible. But if it is the mandatory nature of the Guidelines
that made them unconstitutional, then it is impossible to understand why
Apprendi would not apply to mandatory minimum sentences.
In fact, it would seem that in light of Harris, Congress could circumvent
Booker II by imposing mandatory minimum sentences. This is not just a
hypothetical danger. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez recently indicated that
63. 536 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097 (2005).
66. Almendarez- Torres, 523 U.S. at 244.
67. Frank Bowman, Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Brining the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 364 (2004).
68. Id.
69. This was imposed pursuant 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(a) (2000). Harris, 536 U.S. at 551.
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the Department of Justice would support the creation of a mandatory minimum
guidelines system to fix the advisory system Booker left in place. ° An advantage
of such a system, according to Gonzalez, is that it would "preserve the
protections and principles of the Sentencing Reform Act."'" Apart from the
unfairness and undesirability of mandatory minimum sentences, it makes no
sense under the principles of Apprendi and Blakely for the same factors to lead to
the same increases in sentencing, but for the increase to be allowed because it is
under a mandatory minimum scheme rather than a guideline system.
Simply put, following the principle that it is wrong to convict a person of one
crime but sentence the person for another would necessitate the overruling of
Harris v. United States.
D. Prior Crimes
In United States v. Almendarez-Torres, decided two years before Apprendi,
the Supreme Court held that prior convictions do not have to be proven to a
jury.7 1 In other words, Almendarez-Torres exempts prior convictions from the
general rule that any fact used to increase a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.73 It is because of Almendarez-Torres that the holdings in
Apprendi and Blakely exempted prior convictions from the need for proof beyond
a reasonable doubt to the jury.
Ever since Apprendi it has been predicted that Almendarez-Torres would be
overruled because Justice Thomas, in his Apprendi concurring opinion, made it
clear that his vote had been a mistake.74 Furthermore, four of the dissenting
Justices in Almendarez-Torres were in the majority in Apprendi and Blakely.
7
There have been hundreds of petitions for certiorari raising this issue and not one
has been granted. One would surmise, for whatever reason, that there aren't five
votes on the Court to overrule Almendarez-Torres. Yet, just last year, in Shepard
v. United States, Justice Thomas declared:
[A] majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was
wrongly decided. The parties do not request it here, but in an appropriate
70. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzalez at
the American Bar Association House of Delegates (Aug. 8, 2005) (transcript available http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/speeches/2005/080805agamericanbarassoc.htm) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
71. Id.
72. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
73. Id. at 243-46.
74. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520-21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A]n error to
which I succumbed-was to attempt to discern whether a particular fact is traditionally (or typically) a basis for
a sentencing court to increase an offender's sentence.").
75. Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented in Almendarez-Torres, but were in the
majority in Blakely. Compare Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298 (2003).
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case, this Court should consider Almendarez-Torres' continuing
viability. Innumerable criminal defendants have been unconstitutionally
sentenced under the flawed rule of Almendarez-Torres despite the
fundamental "imperative that the Court maintain absolute fidelity to the
protections of the individual afforded by the notice, trial by jury, and
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements. 76
Thus, one would predict that the Court will soon overrule Almendarez-
Torres, but that has been the prediction ever since Apprendi. But if the Court
were to adopt the principle that it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and
sentence the person for another, the error of Almendarez-Torres would be clear.
Additional punishment is being imposed for another crime, even though that
crime has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
7
E. Indeterminate Sentencing
Williams v. New York stands for the proposition that, in an indeterminate
sentencing system, a judge is:
[N]ot confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed
statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of
punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant-
if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the
possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's
life and characteristics. 78
But in a determinate system that provides a statutory maximum, Apprendi
and Blakely require any fact that enhances a sentence beyond that maximum to
be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
79
There appears to be no principled justification for why, in an indeterminate
system, a judge's discretion is somehow immunized from the jury trial
guarantee."' Indeed, this schizophrenia is reflected in Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in United States v. Booker.1 On the one hand under Blakely, a defendant
has the "right to have the jury find the existence of 'any particular fact' that the
76. 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005).
77. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently provided a vigorous defense of
Almendarez-Torres. See United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2005). The court argued that recidivism
involves the status of a defendant as a repeat offender based on past conviction and the offense being tried
before the court and that a prior conviction has already been determined under due process safeguards and need
not be subjected to a jury for a second time. Id.
78. Williams v. People, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
79. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301-02; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
80. See Reitz, supra note 65, at 1095.
81. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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law makes essential to his punishment."8' But on the other hand, "[i]f the
Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that
recommend, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response
to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.,
83
Thus, the jury trial guarantee vanishes under an indeterminate sentencing system.
An example of this absurd result is if Washington had replaced its statutory
guidelines with an indeterminate system allowing a ten-year maximum for
second-degree kidnapping, the trial judge in Blakely could have imposed the
same sentence without violating the Sixth Amendment. The difficulty is that
Williams is simply incompatible with the idea that it is wrong to convict a person
of one crime but punish them for another. Yet Booker cites Williams as a
tautology, "[w]e have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory range.
' '4
Thus, if the Court committed itself to the idea that it is wrong to convict for
one crime but punish for another, Williams must be overruled unless there is
meaningful reason why the jury trial guarantee disappears when going from a
determinate to an indeterminate sentencing system.
Part of the reason why indeterminate sentencing systems are somehow
immunized from the jury trial guarantee is that, for most of American legal
history, constitutional law took a "hands off' approach to the process of
sentencing defendants. s5 Indeed, in United States v. Tucker, the Court declared
that a judge in the federal system has wide and largely unreviewable discretion in
determining what sentence to impose, so long as the sentence is within statutory
limits. 8 6 Because in an indeterminate system a judge need not state the basis for
imposing a sentence, the procedural laxity embraced by Tucker is
understandable. Through the 1970s, 1980s, and nearly all the 1990s, the Court
tolerated nearly all federal and state punishment mechanisms, no matter how
unfair or absurd.87
But as determinate sentencing systems emerged, so did the basis for a judge's
sentence become the proper focus of inquiry. A collision course between the jury
trial right and determinate sentencing systems requiring judges to impose certain
sentences based on extra-verdict offense or offender information was inevitable.
Thus, the schizophrenia in Booker reflects history and not logic.
82. Id. at 232 (quoting Blakely, 124 U.S at 303).
83. Id. at 233.
84. Id. (citing Williams v. People, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
85. See generally Reitz, supra note 65, at 1083-86.
86. 404 U.S. 443,446-47 (1972).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding that an acquittal on a gun
possession charge does not preclude consideration of conduct underlying the charge at sentencing); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by
prosecution for a cocaine charge when the underlying conduct had been considered at the prior sentencing in a
separate case); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (holding that a mandatory life sentence without
parole for a first time cocaine possession offender does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
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If, however, the Court embraced the idea that it wrong to convict for one
crime and punish for another, then it would have to discard the procedural laxity
reflected in Williams and Tucker.
F. Procedural Protections in Sentencing
In contrast to the procedural protections afforded during a guilt/innocence
trial, a defendant is afforded far less protections at a sentencing proceeding.
There is almost no constitutional protection for a defendant from a sentencing
judge's wide discretion to conduct a broad inquiry "largely unlimited either as to
the kind of information he may consider or the source from which it may
come."88 The idea that it is wrong to convict a person for one crime and punish
him or her for another avoids this problem since all facts supporting a sentence
must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
using the applicable rules of evidence. But in a sentencing proceeding a judge
may consider evidence not admissible at trial.89 Hence, sentences are often based
on a "mishmash of data including blatantly self-serving hearsay." 9 Also, a judge
may consider "reliable evidence that was obtained illegally in fashioning an
appropriate sentence."9' One circuit has even expressed doubt that evidence
should be excluded when authorities have deliberately violated the defendant's
constitutional rights for the purpose of acquiring evidence to boost his
prospective sentence.9 2
Some evidence that a judge may consider creates perverse incentives. For
example, in United States v. Grayson, it was proper for a judge to enhance a
defendant's sentence based on his assessment that the defendant's testimony was
"a complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever."93 Also, in
Roberts v. United States, it was proper for a judge to enhance a defendant's
sentence based on his refusal to cooperate with authorities in naming his heroin
suppliers. 94 The Guidelines have essentially codified these holdings by allowing
88. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,446 (1972).
89. See Williams v. People, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see also FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
90. United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 280 (D. Mass 2004).
91. United States v. Brimah, 214 F.3d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2000). Nine other circuits have also
determined that evidenced obtained by illegal searches and seizures are not bared from sentencing proceedings.
United States v. Tauil-Hemandez, 88 F.3d 576, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426
1432-36 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1260-63 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Jessup, 966 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 70
(D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 322-25 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Lynch, 934
F.2d 1226, 1234-37 (11 th Cir. 1991).
92. United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 238 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("It is awfully
hard to see why motive should matter on either prudential or doctrinal grounds.").
93. 438 U.S. 41, 44 (1978).
94. 445 U.S. 522 (1980).
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judges to consider the offender's remorse" and cooperation with law-
enforcement personnel in continued criminal investigations.96 An undesirable
consequence of permitting a judge to make an individual assessment of a
defendant's truthfulness or remorse is the risk of intimidating genuinely innocent
defendants from standing trial, testifying truthfully, and preserving their
appeals. 97 Furthermore, rewarding guilty defendants for post-conviction
admissions and assistance in solving other crimes "perversely twist[s] the law of
sentencing into a prosecutor's crime-solving tool." 98
In sum, these perverse incentives are avoided through the idea that it is
wrong to convict for one crime but punish for another. That idea ensures
defendants are punished only for what is admitted or for what is proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt under applicable evidentiary protections.
G. The Role of the Jury in Death Penalty Cases
If the Court were to follow the principle that it is wrong to convict a person
of one crime but to sentence for another, there would be a need to reconsider the
requirement that the jury find the aggravating factors warranting imposition of a
death sentence.
In Walton v. Arizona, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
state allowing a judge to impose a death sentence. 99 In Ring v. Arizona,'0° the
Court reconsidered Walton in light'of Apprendi and overruled Walton. Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court in a seven to two decision, declared:
For the reasons stated, we hold that Walton and Apprendi are
irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be home to
both. Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. Because
Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as "the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury. '
Justice Ginsburg concluded her majority opinion with the powerful statement:
"The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be
senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a
95. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1. 1 (2005).
96. Id. § 5K1.1.
97. See ARTHUR CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 9.8 (3d ed. 2004).
98. Id.
99. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
100. 536 U. S. 584 (2002).
101. Id. at 609.
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defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to
death."' °2
But if Apprendi is seen as resting on the proposition that it is wrong to
convict a person for one crime and sentence the person for another, the
distinction that Justice Ginsburg dismisses as "senseless" would make sense. If
the additional two years of sentence are imposed for another crime, that crime
would have to be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If the additional
two years of sentence were imposed for a reason other than another crime, such
as the failure to show remorse, then it would not have to be proven to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, the question would be whether first degree murder with a death
sentence should be regarded as a different crime than first degree murder without
a death sentence. There certainly is an argument that the presence of aggravating
factors makes it a different crime, for the same reason that the "deliberate
cruelty" in Blakely made the kidnapping a different crime. But this would need to
be the justification for applying Apprendi and Blakely to capital crimes and it was
not the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in Ring.
10 3
III. CONCLUSION
It seems so simple and so basic to say that it is wrong to convict a person of
one crime and then punish the person for another. Yet, an examination of the
criminal justice system reveals that there are many ways in which it deviates
from this elemental principle. Apprendi and Blakely provide a way of correcting
these injustices if it is taken as establishing that any crime that is used as a basis
for sentencing must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
102. Id.
103. As my colleague Sara Beale pointed out, there also may be other reasons for requiring the jury to
find the basis for a death sentence beyond the application of Apprendi so that following the principle I suggest
would not necessarily require overruling Ring. Those reasons, though, were not alluded to by the Court in Ring
and would need to be developed by the Court.

